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A common problem with systems that use passwords for authen-
tication results when users choose weak passwords. Weak passwords
are passwords that arc easy to guess, or likely to be found in a dictio-
nary attack. Thus, the choice of weak passwords may lead to system
compromisation.
Methods exist to prevent users from selecting and using weak pass-
words. One common method is to compare user choices against a list
ofunRcceptable words. The problem with. this approach is the amount
of space required to store even a modest-sized dictionary of prohibited
password choices.
This paper describes a space-efficient method of storing a didio-
nary of words that are not allowed as password choices. Lookups in
the didionary are 0(1) (constant time) no maHer how many words
are in the didionary. The mechanism described has other interesting
features, a few of which are described here.
Keywords: passwords, didionaries, password aging
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1 Introduction
Passwords are a commonly-used method of authentication. A unique se-
quence of characters is presented to the system when identification is needed.
This sequence is then compared with a stored sequence, perhaps after some
transformation (e.g., encryption). A match provides the proof of identity.
One weakness with password systems is the choice of the password. If
the choice of possible characters to use in the password is too small, or
if the overall length of the password is too short, the password may be
compromisable. Even a rich character set may not be sufficient to create
secure passwords lithe combination of characters is restricted to an arbitrary
set of possibilities. Thus, good password choice should avoid common words
and names (d. [15,1,10,6]).
As an example, consider the UNIX l password system. This password
mechanism is based on a cryptographic transformation of a fixed string of
zero bits, using the user-supplied password as a key.[12] The transformation
is an altered version of DES encryption, performed 25 times. The transfor-
mation is sufficiently slow so that exhaustive keyspace attacks are currently
not practical, although fast implementation such as deszip,[3] can perform
many thousands or tens of thousands of comparisons per second.
In UNIX, the encrypted version of the password has traditionally been
kept in a world-readable file; the safety of the passwords has been protected
by the time complexity of an exhaustive attack. Thus, one of the keys to
the safety of UNIX passwords is a large potential keyspace for passwords.
If the full character set is used, and seven or eight-character passwords are
chosen, the number of potential passwords to be searched is far too large
to be successfully searched, even at high speed.2 Unfortunately, users often
select passwords that do not exploit the large keyspace available. Instead,
they choose common words and names, or simple transformations of those
names. This greatly simplifies an attacker's task.
This tendency to select weak passwords has led to a number of system
break-ins, some quite highly publicized: [21, 20, 18, 23, 14]. Current tech-
nology is such that construction of a large pre-encrypted dictionary on-line
using optical disks is easily done. By creating such a dictionary, a password
,
UNIX is a trademark of Unix System Laboratories, Inc.,
Assuming a usable character set of 120 characters, there are approximately 4.335geI6
possible passwords. At 10,000 attempts per second, an exhaustive search of this keyspace
would require over 137,000 years to complete.
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search and attack may be easily conducted in a matter of seconds. Without
such a database, but using a tool such as deszip on a modern workstation, it
is possible to make a full scan of 300,000 dictionary entries against several
hundred passwords in a matter of a few days.
Despite wide-spread publication of good password policy and the risks
inherent in bad passwords, users continue to select weak passwords. This is
a continuing threat to the best·managed systems. (For example: [9, 2, 15,
8,7,10,6,11,19,22,24].)
There are four basic methods for a system adminis trator to enforce better
password security on a computer system:
1. Educate and encourage users to make better choices of passwords.
2. Generate strong passwords for users and do not allow them to choose
passwords of their own creation. Tills is often done using some random
password generator.
3. Check passwords after-the-fact and force users to change those that
can be easily broken with a dictionary attack.
4. Screen users' password choices and prevent weak ones from being in-
stalled.
Tills first method, that of educating users to choose strong passwords,
is not likely to be of use in environments where there is a significant num-
ber of novices, or where turnover is high. Users might not understand the
importance of choosing strong passwords, and novice users are not the best
judges of what is "obvious." For instance, novice users (mistakenly) may be-
lieve that reversing a word, or capitalizing the last letter makes a password
"strong."
A further problem is if the education provided to users on how to select
a password is itself dangerous. For instance, if the education provided gives
users a specific way to create passwords, such as using the first letters of
a favorite phrase, then many of the users may all use that algorithm, thus
making an attack easier.
The second method of strengthening passwords is to generate the pass-
words for the users and not allow them the opportunity to select a weak
password. For this mechanism to work well the passwords need to be ran-
domly drawn from the whole keyspace. Unfortunately, this method also has
flaws. In particular, the "random" mechanism chosen might not be truly
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random, and could be analyzed by an attacker. Furthermore, random pass-
words are often difficult to memorize (especially if they are changed (aged)
regularly). As a result, users may write the passwords down, thus providing
an opportunity to intercept them without the effort of a dictionary search.
The third method of preventing poor password choice is to scan the
passwords selected, after they are chosen, to see if any are weak. This
is supported by many systems, including deszip and COPs.[5] There are
significant problems with this approach:
• The dictionary used in the search may not be comprehensive enough
to catch some weak passwords. Outside attackers might think of
these choices, but the password scanner would not include them in
the search.
• The scanning approach takes time, even for a fast implementation.
A lucky (or detennined) attacker may be able penetrate a system
through a weak password before it is discovered by the scanner. This
is especially a problem in an environment with a very large number of
users.
• The output of a scanner may be intercepted and used against the
system.
Additionally, there is not always a correlation between finding a weak pass-
word and getting it replaced with a stronger one. At my university, for
instance, at least two faculty members have repeatedly been informed of
the weakness of their passwords as exposed by a scanner, but they have not
chosen new passwords in over three years.
The fourth method, that of disallowing the choice of poor passwords in
the first place, appears to have none of the drawbacks mentioned above.
However, it too has difficulties associated with it. In particular, the stor-
age required to keep a sufficiently large dictionary may prevent this method
from being used on workstations and small computer systems. For instance,
the standard UNIX dictionary, jusrjdictfwords, is about 25,000 words and
200,000 bytes of space. A dictionary of 10 to 20 times that size would be nec-
essary for reasonable protection; there are over 170,000 words in Webster's
New World Dictionary, and that would occupy well over a million bytes of
disk storage. That figure does not include many slang and colloquial words
and phrases, nor does it include any user names, local names and phrases,
likely words in foreign languages, or other strings shown to be poor pass-
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word choices. A comprehensive dictionary mlght double these figures, and
require over three million bytes of storage.
Maintaining such a large dictionary is also difficult. To add new words
or phrases means that the dictionary must either have additional space over-
head for indexing, it must be sorted after each addition, or else lookups are
linear in the length of the dictionary. Again, in small computer environ-
ments, none of these alternatives may be appropriate.
2 OPUS
The Opus Project3 is intended to address the space problems associated
with a sufficiently complex password screening dictionary. The goal is to
derive a mechanism that provides protection equivalent to a comparison
against a large dictionary, yet be small enough to be practical in a small
computer environment.
2.1 The Dictionary Filter
The main component of this system is a Bloom filter·encoded version of
the dictionary.[4] A Bloom fllter is a well-studied probabilistic membership
checker, often used in applications such as spelling checkers.[16, 13, 17J It
works as follows: a word to be entered into the filter is passed through n
independent hash functions generating integer values. Each of these values
is used as an index into the filter, represented as a bitmap. The bits cor-
responding to the input word are then set. This procedure is repeated for
each word to be entered into the filter.
When a lookup is to be performed, the word to be examined is passed
through the same hash functions and the corresponding bits in the filter
are examined. If any of the bits is reset (Le., not set), then the word is
determined not to be present in the dictionary. If all the corresponding
bits are set, the likelihood is high that the word was in the list that was
used to build the dictionary, and in the case of Opus, rejected as a weak
password choice. The probability of a false rejection can be set arbitrarily
low by increasing the size of the bitmap and increasing the number of hash
functions usedj an obvious upper bound is the size of the plaintext dictionary.
To be more exact, assume we have a hash table of N bits, and d non-
overlapping hash functions. From [4], with n words we have the proportion
,
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of bits left unset, q" equal to
A word will be falsely shown as present in the dictionary iff it hashes to
a set of bits that are all set. The expected proportion, P, of words that will
be mistakenly shown as in the dictionary is thus
P=(l-q»'
From these equations, we can derive appropriate values to choose for our
ftlter and hash functions.
For example, suppose we pick n = 250,000 words for the dictionary, and
we wish to have a 0.5% chance (P = 0.005) of false positives on any given
text string. If we choose six uniform hash functions, we will need 2,800,000
bits of storage and achieve ¢ = 0.586. Thls works out to a me of 350K
bytes. Reducing P = 0.01 results in needing only 300K bytes of storage for
the dictionary. Storing the full dictionary as plaintext would likely take in
excess of 2 Mb of storage. Thus, we are able to achieve almost a seven-fold
compression with only a small loss of accuracy.
As can be seen from the above examples, with the appropriate choice of
hash functions it is possible to greatly reduce the storage necessary to keep
an extensive dictionary of words to compare against password choices. By
making queries on the dictionary with variations of the candidate password
- upper/lower case, reversed, trailing digit, etc. - it should be possible
to quickly check for the strength of the password. Each probe into the
dictionary is basically a constant-time operation, so the number of words in
the dictionary has no effect on the time of access. IT the union of all the
probes results in a positive response, the user is told to try again.
2.2 Other Features
The model of the dictionary used in Opus provides benefits other than
simple dictionary lookup. By providing a writable interface to the dictionary
for the system administrator, it is a simple task to add the representation of
new words to the dictionary. The administrator can therefore augment the
dictionary with local user names and colloquialisms. Adding words to the
dictionary requires no expensive sort or temporary storage. Furthermore,
the system administrator never needs to be concerned if a word has already
been added - adding a word more than once has no effect.
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The Opus system also supports password aging. With password aging,
users are required to change their passwords periodically. However, a com·
mon fault with password aging is that users attempt to reuse old passwords,
and tills may present a security risk.
Opus can be configured so that whenever a password is changed, it is
added to the dictionary. Thus, if a user attempts to reuse an old password,
she will find it already in the dictionary, and the choice will not be allowed.
As seen from the value of <P, above, there is plenty of room in the dictio-
nary for adding new words, so even prolonged operation wlll not result in a
noticeable degradation of service.
One obvious problem with updating the dictionary in this manner is the
possibility of an attacker using delta information to craft a set of password
attempts. That is, by observing the changes made to the filter when another
user changes his password, an attacker mlght be able to use the hash func-
tions to derive a set of possible text strings that account for the changes,
and use these in a penetration attempt.
A related problem is if an attacker finds a way to use the dictionary as a
filtering mechanism to exclude patterns when doing a brute-force keyspace
search to break passwords. Doing a probe into the dictionary will deter·
mine if a candidate is a possible choice or not, thus saving (some) on the
computation required to perform an exhaustive search.
Luckily, there is a simple way to defeat these problems. Instead of hash-
ing plaintext words into the dictionary, Opus first encrypts the words to
be entered or examined. The encryption will be something time-consuming,
similar to multiple rounds of the DES function, and computationally infea-
sible to reverse. The hashing algorithms are then applied to the encrypted
string rather than to the plaintext. Thus, to gain any information from the
dictionary, either as a pre-screen or as a source of delta information, would
require much more computational effort than some other approach (e.g.,
exhaustive keyspace search).
3 Final Remarks
This paper has discussed the motivations and design beillnd a system for
preventing users from installing weak passwords. The system should be
compact and simple to customize and enhance. It can be used standalone,
as a frontend to an existing password program, or coupled with some form
of password generator so as to prevent the accidental generation of a word
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susceptible to dictionary attacks.
The choice of hashing algorithms used with the system is critical for the
success of the filter. Choosing non-uniform or overlapping hash algorthms
reduces the effectiveness of the Bloom filter by increasing the incidence of
false positives (effectively shrinking the number of useful bits employed). If
possible, the hash algorithms should be chosen to produce the same results
whether used on a string or on its reverse. This will allow probes for com-
mon words and their reverses to be made simultaneously. Case-insensitivity
can also be used in the hash functions, but this may result in too great a
narrowing of the keyspace; words in monocase, or with only a leading or
trailing capital letter are perhaps the only combinations that need to be
examined.
A UNIX version of Opus is being constructed. It will be preloaded with
a locally-developed dictionary of almost 300,000 words. Experiments will
then be conducted to determine, for this dictionary, the optimal working
size and number of hash functions. Further experiments will determine the
accuracy rate for rejection of candidate passwords that are not present in
the real dictionary, and the speed of operation. By performing side-by-
side experiments with users selecting potential passwords and comparing a
dictionary search with the results of the Bloom filter, it should be possible
to determine the overall utility of this approach. The results from those
experiments will be reported later.
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